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The Threshold Requirement in Asymmetric Conflicts: A
Game Theory Analysis
Alon Cohen and Raphael Bitton"
Abstract
In recent years, ad bellum rules have been interoreted more leniently so as to permit
forble responses to terrorism. Yet the threshold level for an "armed attack" that legitmizesfull-scale war in response has remained relatively high. This observation is especaly puzzling
insofar as customary international law reflects the practice of (strong) states, which, as we show,
can benefit from credibly committing to lowering their tolerance towards terror attacks. Why is
the threshold requirement relatively tolerant? What would be the critical mass of terror beyond
which a full-scale war is legitimate? Under what circumstances are states expected to violate the
ad bellum threshold requirement?
This Article seeks compelling answers to these questions using game theory. We argue
that a low ad bellum threshold requirement (an "intolerant strategy") is a futile measure tofight terrorism, since normally it cannot underlie a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. NameLy,
were a strong state to seriously consider waging a full-scale war in response to repeated, low-level
terror attacks sponsored by a weak state, both parties would be better off renegotiating their
way back to the status quo ante. On the other hand, renegotiation may fail if transaction costs
are high enough, which ultimatey makes the intolerant strategy sustainable and the equilibrium
level of terror lower. The overall conclusion is thus counterintuitive: an effective intolerant
strategy in the War on Terror is beneficalfor victim states, but implausible unless the barriers
towards a nonviolent arrangement are sufiienty high.
Respectively, alonc@post.tau.ac.il, the Law Faculty, Hebrew University, and
rephaelb@gmail.com, Haifa University. We thank Eyal Benvenisti, Sharon Hannes, Shai N. Lavie,
Zvika Neeman, Ady Pauzner, Ariel Porat, Eric Posner, David Rosenberg, Ariel Rubinstein,
Avraham Tabbach, and the participants of seminars in the law faculties of Tel Aviv University
and the interdisciplinary Center in Hcrzliya for very helpful comments and insights. All errors are
ours.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the pattern of asymmetric international conflicts, the weak side often
uses terror and guerilla warfare against its stronger rival. Surprisingly, the victims
of terror are relatively tolerant, despite their military superiority. They tend to
obey the ad bellum threshold rule that allows a state to wage a full-scale war only
in response to a substantial provocation that constitutes an "armed attack."
When the provocation falls short of an armed attack, the victim state normally
contains the attack or responds rather moderately. This is surprising considering
the repetitive nature of terror attacks, which victim states normally can foresee.
It is even more surprising in light of the fact that a credible threat of waging a
full-scale war, in itself, can theoretically decrease terror to its minimum. Why do
these much stronger states usually comply with the threshold requirement,
which seems tolerant toward terror? What is the critical mass of terror, beyond
which a full-scale war is legitimate? Under which circumstances are states
nevertheless expected to violate the ad bellum threshold rule?
Consider a simple paradigm of an unequal, bilateral, international conflict.
A strong state suffers repeated terror attacks, which are directly or indirectly
orchestrated by a militarily weaker rival state.! Due to its superiority, the strong
state can theoretically threaten to wage a full-scale war against the weak state in
response to any terror act, regardless of scale or effect it induces.2 We refer to
this as an "intolerant trigger strategy." If the threat is credible, which is feasible
in dynamic and repeated conflicts, a rational weak state is expected to submit to
I A good example would be the Turkey-Syria-PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) triangular
relationship. Being militarily inferior, Syria used the PKK organization to exact a toll on Turkey,
with whom it had a long territorial conflict. The applicability of our theory, however, extends
beyond this sort of example. The main idea is leverage: the existence of military inequality
between the conflicting parties that can effectively come into play. Thus, even if the weak state
merely harbors the terror organization without actively directing it, our theory still applies insofar
as the harboring state has some ability to control the terrorists. Such was the case, for instance,
with Pakistan-Taliban relations prior to 9/11 or Syria-Hezbollah relations prior to the Syrian civil
war. Our model also applies to a direct conflict between a strong state and a terror organization,
provided that the latter is a state-like entity. In this case, again, the power asymmetry can
underwrite a credible threat against the terror organization directly. Such is the case with the
ongoing struggle between Israel and Hamas, who controls the Gaza strip (after violently taking it
over in the 2007 Battle of Gaza). Our theory, however, is not relevant to all kinds of terrorism.
Stateless terrorism that is scattered globally and unanswerable to the authority of any viable entity
to whom the credible threat can be made does not suit our paradigm. Ostensible modern
examples are Al-Qaeda (in contrast with its pre-9/11 status) and the Islamic State/ISIS. Ironically,
when such a terror group becomes more and more powerful, inevitably they gain more assets,
interests, and state relations that may yet provide the leverage required for our theory to apply.
2 The notion of full-scale war by a state refers to the comprehensive and continuous use of force
against a target state or organization, which is far broader than a reprisal that is limited in time or
scope, with the goal of continuing such use of force until the desired military or political
outcomes are met.
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it. Terror would thus be eradicated, or at least minimized, which would clearly
benefit the strong state. Despite this apparent benefit, however, strong states
that suffer from terror, even those as strong as the U.S., normally do not employ
intolerant trigger strategies. Full-scale wars are usually waged only if the
preceding armed attack surpasses some substantial critical mass (as was the case
following 9/11).'
One immediate explanation for this puzzle relies on international law.
Strong states, arguably, may prefer to act intolerantly toward terrorists and the
states that harbor them, but find themselves obligated to comply with
international law against their own interests. In other words, states might actually
want to adopt an intolerant approach against terror. And yet, the ad bellum
threshold rule that prohibits waging war unless the preceding provocation is
substantial precludes them from doing so. Indeed, the traditional international
lawyers' wisdom holds that nations have various noninstrumental, voluntary
motivations for complying with international law.4
Proponents of the new international law scholarship, however, such as Jack
Goldsmith and Eric Posner, consider this type of explanation insufficient.5 Their
underlying argument is that states are self-interested, and thus their strategies are
primarily the result of rational choices. International law reflects such states'
practice, and not the other way around. Hence, in order to explain the relatively
tolerant ad bellum threshold rule in unequal conflicts, one must rationalize the
underlying states' practice.
This logic guides Goldsmith and Posner in their analysis of customary
international law using game theory.6 Among other things, they also address
asymmetric setup of conflict using an "entry deterrence" model similar to ours.
The strong state warns the weak one not to engage in some activity, which may
harm the former's interests (in our context, this activity would be terror, of
course). The nature of the threat entails some sanctioning or even a severe
military response against the weak side. If the costs of exercising the threat are
sufficiently low, the threat is credible and the weak state will submit to it. The
strong state too, for its part, may refrain from the same activity but for different
3 See discussion and sources cited, infra note 16.
4 See, for example, Abram Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A Comparaive Perpective, in Engaging
Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords 39-62 (1998);
Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995); Harold Hongju Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599 (1997).
5 See generaly Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customag International Law, 66 U. CHI
L. REV. 1113 (1999); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & EpiC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005); Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New international Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J.
INT'L & ComP. L. 463 (2006).
6 Seegeneralyl Goldsmith & Posner, A Theog of Customay International Law, supra note 5.
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reasons, such as high alternative costs. Eventually both states refrain from that
activity, a result that may subsequently evolve into a customary rule in the eyes
of the observer.
This model, however, cannot fully explain the paradigmatic unequal
conflicts on which we focus. The puzzling situation we review here is one where
a weak state does engage in a harmful activity (terror) against a strong one, in
violation of international law; but the latter, in compliance with international law,
neither retaliates with its full power nor threatens to do so.
At first glance, one could argue that our paradigm simply implies the
impossibility of making credible threats. That is, the costs of punishing the weak
state by waging a full-scale war are not trivial for the strong state, its military
superiority notwithstanding. Therefore, the argument goes, the threat to punish
simply may not be credible. Because the weak state is aware of that, it is not
deterred from engaging in terror against the strong one. This explanation,
however, is far from satisfactory.
We show that in an infinitely repeated game setup, where the confrontation
takes place continuously, strong states can build up credible intolerant threats to
which their (rational) weak rivals submit 7 We show that strong states can indeed
credibly threaten to launch a full-scale war even in response to a relatively low
level of terror. An antiterror war is expected to reduce the terror level as a result
of undermining the enemy's capabilities or motivation. The benefit of carrying
out that threat is the terror damage the war manages to prevent over time for the
strong state. Repeated interactions increase this benefit and thus may render war
cost-effective. One would not spend 100 in war in order to save terror damage
of 90 this year. But saving 20 every year in the next 10 years could be reason
enough to spend 100 today.'
7 Industrial organization literature has long established effective deterrence strategies of incumbent
firms against their rivals, using "predation prices" and other restrictive measures costly to the
incumbent firm itself. These models, however, heavily rely on information asymmetry. See, for
example, Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pridng and Entry under Incomplete Information: An
Equilibrium .Anaysis, 50 ECONOMITRICA 443 (1982); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation,
Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THIORY 280 (1982). Nevertheless, we argue that if
indeed similar equilibrium exists in international conflicts-whereby strong states employ costly
strategies to deter weaker states from provoking them-it could be for reasons other than
information asymmetry.
8 Our argument, in fact, goes much further than that. We claim that even if the terror level is very
low such that the benefits from eradicating it in all future periods fall below the current costs of
war for the strong state, the threat of war can still be credible. This is because the benefits of war
for the strong state should not be measured as the gap between the terror level it suffers before
the full-scale war it wages and the level following it. It should be measured as the gap between the
terror level in the absence of war and following one. Because the terror level plausibly increases
when the weak state provokes the strong one and goes unpunished, war actually may prevent
more terror than what the strong state currently suffers.
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Consequently, a subgame perfect equilibrium, which describes credible
strategies of both states in a dynamic and repeated conflict, can be based on a
strong state's intolerant strategy and ultimately minimize terror.9 This, of course,
reiterates the need to explain why strong states normally do not employ such
strategies. We maintain that the reason is the ability of the conflicting (rational)
parties to communicate, directly or indirectly. If the attacks sponsored by the
weak state should trigger a full-scale war by the strong state according to its
subgame perfect equilibrium strategy, the parties would presumably renegotiate
their way back to the status quo ante. By definition, neither party is better off
deviating alone from its equilibrium strategy; yet both parties are better off if
they joint!y deviate. The strong state avoids severely damaging the weak one by
waging a full-scale war; the latter, in return, refrains from escalating terror as a
response to its rival containment strategy.
Hence, a subgame perfect equilibrium that is based upon an intolerant
trigger strategy cannot survive renegotiation perfection." On the other hand, a
subgame perfect equilibrium that survives renegotiation perfection is more
plausible. We show that such equilibrium is characterized by relatively high levels
of terror in the victim state, which correspond to its tolerant strategy. We argue
that this is the main reason for the implausibility of strong states' intolerant
trigger strategies. Hence, the ad bellum threshold rule, which prohibits waging a
full-scale war in response to mild provocations, may simply reflect that notion.1"
Next, we turn to discuss the circumstances in which the strong party may
breach the ad bellum threshold rule and act intolerantly. Because renegotiation
in fact is a barrier to eradicating terror, the strong state may benefit from its
failure. Counterintuitively, "transaction costs" may do the trick. Recall that
foreseeable renegotiation is what derogates the credibility of the intolerant
strategy in the first place. If the parties can predict, however, that such
negotiation will fail, intolerance becomes effective. For instance, the leader of a
strong state could be anxious to go to war for idiosyncratic political reasons.
9 For a more detailed description of the subgame perfect equilibrium notion, see discussion, infra
note 41.
10 See Joseph Farrell & Eric Maskin, Renegofiation in Repeated Games, 1 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAVIOR
327 (1989). Renegotiation perfection is a refinement concept, usually used to narrow down the set
of subgame perfect equilibria, in order to have a more precise prediction for the outcome of
games. Basically, it means that if at some point both players agree to change course, the original
subgame perfect equilibrium is not renegotiation-proof, and thus can be eliminated as implausible.
1 We also deal with several critiques of this hypothesis and make a more refined prediction
regarding states' practice in that regard, using a more complicated perfection criterion. For
example, one may argue that the renegotiation that supposedly restores the status quo ante is not
a reliable prediction. What would stop the weak state, the argument goes, from repeating the
routine of provocation-then-renegotiation in the future? We show that even this logic cannot help
sustain intolerant strategies (and, in turn, the lower levels of terror they generate).
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Alternatively, potential mediators in the international community may suffer
from a collective action problem. The conflicting parties, in this case, foresee the
futility of renegotiation. Hence, a strong state's intolerant strategy can support a
renegotiation-proof equilibrium in which the parties will not agree to change
course or strategy during the period of the "game." Because an intolerant,
renegotiation-proof strategy benefits the strong state, we predict that in these
circumstances it may ignore the ad bellum threshold rule and employ an
intolerant trigger strategy towards its weaker rivals. As abnormal as this may
sound, transaction costs in the international sphere may lead to better results in
the War on Terror. An effective international mechanism for negotiating de-
escalation arrangements will actually increase the level of state-sponsored terror.
We support this insight with some evidence from international conflicts
worldwide.12
The work proceeds as follows. Section II sketches the practice and law of
unequal conflicts, describing our doctrinal premise of a tolerant threshold rule.
Section III demonstrates our argument using a simple numeric example. Section
IV engages an unequal, bilateral confrontation model, which shows one
plausible set of subgame perfect equilibria based on tolerant and intolerant
trigger strategies. Section V refines the set of subgame perfect equilibria based
on renegotiation perfection, grounding our argument in the origins of the
threshold requirement as well as its possible violation. Section VI then concludes
by pointing out other areas of international law, such as treaty practice, to which
this Article's insights can extend.
II. THE PRACTICE & LAW OF UNEQUAL CONFLICTS
A. Terrorism in Unequal Conflicts
Many international conflicts are unequal in terms of the military capacity of
the parties. Any full-scale war in these circumstances, albeit costly also to the
strong state, would clearly end up causing enormous damage to the weak one.
Hence, the latter often employs an indirect conflict strategy by endorsing
12 This Article focuses on patterns of terror sponsoring. However, the analysis it offers can readily
serve as the groundwork for understanding many other unequal confrontations in international
relations. It can explain, for example, what made the Syrian regime violate the intolerant "red
line" threat set by the U.S. concerning the use of chemical weapons. And it can assist in
explaining the renegotiation and its ensuing results. For more on first signals of an intolerant
trigger strategy, see Mark Landler, Obama Threatens Force Against Sjria, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 20, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21 /world/middeeast/obama-threatens-force-against-
syria.html. For an account of the events from the Administration's perspective-from making the
threat to it being nonrenegotiation-proof-see Chemical Weapons Attack in Syria, News and Updates,
WHITE HousiE, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/syria (last visited
Feb. 25, 2015).
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terrorism and guerilla warfare against its stronger rival, hoping to maintain the
low intensity of the conflict. In many cases, this indirect strategy is also based on
the weaker state's belief that in the long run it will accomplish its territorial or
ideological goals.
A clear example of such a strategic use of terror is the situation in Syria.
Patrick Seale maintains that Syria's former president, Hafez al-Assad, preferred
to manage a conflict over disputed territories with Israel and Turkey via terrorist
proxies rather than wage a full-scale war with these much stronger states. 3 Libya
adopted a similar strategy against the U.S. during the 1970s and the 1980s.14
Pakistan also has orchestrated one of the largest wars by proxy in history, using
the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba against India to release the Indian grip on
Kashmir."5
Normally, victim states do not retaliate against terror attacks with full-scale
military force, but rather with restrained on-the-spot force or mild reprisals. 6
Interestingly, a doctrinal review of ad bellum rules reveals that their
interpretation has transformed, especially after the 9/11 attacks. 7 Although
there is no international consensus concerning these changes, the conditions
under which forcible responses to terrorism are permitted have become more
lenient. One crucial rule, however, has remained fairly stable-the ad bellum
13 See generaly PATRICK SLALE, ASAD: THE STRUGGLE FOR THES MIDDLE EAST (1990). Seale reports
that Assad jailed PLO leader Arafat when he suspected that Arafat deliberately planned to
increase terror to a level high enough to drag Syria into an undesired war with stronger Israel. On
the other hand, of course, weak states may make "calculation mistakes." Nasrallah, the leader of
Hezbollah, stated following the 2006 war in Lebanon that had he anticipated Israel's severe
response, he would not have committed the provocation that ignited it. See Hezbollah Leader
Nasrallah Regrets War, CBS NEWS, Aug. 28, 2006, http://wwv.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2006/
08/27/nasrallah-abduction.html.
"4 SFee generaly W. Hays Parks, Lessons from the 1986 LibyaAirsttike, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 755 (2002).
15 See ,generally Bruce Riedel, Pakistan and Terror. The Eye ofthe Storm, 618 THIS ANNALS OF THE AM.
ACADEMY OF POLL. & SOC. SCl. 31 (2008); Brahma Chellaney, Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia:
The Lessons of History, 26 INT'L SEC. 94 (2002).
16 It took quite a few attacks by Libyan proxies in the 1980s before the U.S. responded with the El
Dorado Canyon operation. See Parks, supra note 14, at 757-59. It took years of rocket attacks on
Israeli settlements before Israel launched its 1982 campaign in Lebanon and its 2008 campaign in
Gaza; in fact, 2,427 rockets were fired on Israel from Gaza in 2007 alone. Israel Under Fire, Israel
Defense Forces, available at http://www.idfblog.com/facts-figures/rocket-attacks-toward-israel/
(last visited Feb. 10, 2015); see also Barry A. Feinstein, The Legality of the Use ofArmed Force by Israel
in Lebanon-June 1982, 20 ISR. L. REV. 362 (1985). Similarly, it took Turkey years of Syrian support
of PKK's training and attacks before it issued its threat of full-scale war in 1998. See Eyal Zisser,
Syria and the United States. Bad Habits Die Hard, 10(3) MIDDLE E. Q. 29 (2003). The U.S.
approached Pakistan with an aggressive threat of war only after 9/11 and after years of the latter's
known support of the Taliban and A1-Qaeda. See Riedel, supra note 15.
17 On the process of softening the ad bellum rules concerning the use of force in the war against
terror, see generally Christian J. Tams, The Use of fore against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT'l L. 359
(2009).
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"threshold requirement." By that we mean the scale and effect of a terror attack
that legitimizes a full-scale war by the victim state. Despite some difference of
opinion, the consensus is that a full-scale retaliation in response to a relatively
mild attack is prohibited. In what follows, we establish that doctrinal premise.18
B. Several Ad Bellum Rules Revisited
Recourse to full-scale war is legitimate under several ad bellum conditions,
inter alia, where it has a "just cause."19 Accordingly, Article 51 of the UN
Charter conditions the use of force on a preceding "armed attack."2 As
indicated above, several aspects of this rule were reshaped in the course of the
War on Terror led by the U.S.
First, in post-9/11 conflicts, it has become virtually a foregone conclusion
that acts of terror can constitute an armed attack.21 These horrific acts have
shown that the scale and effect of terror may even exceed the harm of a
conventional attack.22 Accordingly, the U.S. resorting to force against AI-Qaeda
and Taliban targets in Afghanistan was widely supported. Furthermore,
prominent scholars acknowledge that a non-state actor can be the perpetrator of
18 See also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFNCI; (2011); ANTONIO CASSFSE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2005); Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionalit of Countermeasures in
International Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 715 (2008).
19 In addition, a war must be the last resort, and its intensity must be proportionate. Three other
(less important) ad bellum conditions are that war must be declared by an authorized organ,
should be fought with right intention, and have a reasonable prospect of success. See Thomas
Hurka, Pmporlionalioy in the Moralify of War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 34, 35-37 (2005). Once a war
commences, the rules of legitimate warfare govern the use of force (us in bello).
20 "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 51.
21 See, for example, Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism ofJus Ad
Bellum and Jus In Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 47 (2009). Corten
is a rare opposing voice in that regard. See OLIVIER CORTLN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE
PROHIBITON ON THE USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).
22 See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 41 (2002).
23 President Bush declared in his speech to ajoint Session of Congress that the events of 9/11 were
acts of war. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20,
2001). Congress accordingly authorized the President to use force. See S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong.
(2001). The U.N. Security Council has issued two resolutions supporting the use of force while
indirecdy implying that the attacks constitute an armed attack. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). NATO
activated its collective self-defense clause in Article 5, stating clearly that it was responding to an
armed attack following 9/11. See Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, An Attack on usAl"
NATO's Response to Terrorism, Remarks (Oct. 10, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/
speech/2001/s011010b.htm.
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an armed attack even if such an attack does not reach the scale of the 9/11
events.24 State practice reaffirms this perception.5
Second, imputing liability for an armed attack to the state that harbors the
terror organization became easier post-9/11. Originally, the terror organization
had to belong to a governmental structure, at least de facto. 26 For example, in its
TadiW ruling, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) lowered the requirement of states' responsibility to "overall control"
over the terror organization. 2' Again, it seems that the events of 9/11 have
reshaped the doctrine on states' responsibility for acts of terrorism (the "Bush
Doctrine") to require only the broad basis of "harboring and supporting" the
terror group.
2 8
24 See, for example, Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the R'ght to Sef-Defense Post-
9/11, 105 AM. J. INT'L L 244, 260-67 (2011); DINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 227-30; CASSESE, supra
note 18, at 354-55.
25 See Cassesse's clear conviction: "Self-defense is the lawful reaction to an 'armed attack', that is to
massive armed aggression ... the aggression need not come from a state; it can also emanate
from a terrorist organization or even from insurgents." CASSESE, supra note 18, at 354-55. See also
DINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 227; Sloane, supra note 21, at 99-100; Tams, supra note 17, at 378. For
instance, Turkey conducted repeated large-scale military campaigns in Northern Iraq against the
PKK (without targeting Iraq at all). See Eunyoung Kim & Minwoo Yun, What Works?
Countermeasures to Terrorism: A Case Study of PKK, 32 INT'I.J. CoMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 65, 73
(2008). See also Daren Butler & Davis Dolan, Turkish Military Launch Operation Targeting Kurdish
Rebel Hideouts, REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/24/us-turkey-
kurds-idUSKBNOMK17H20150324. Colombia fought FARC forces in Ecuador's territory. See
Frank M. Walsh, Rethinking the Legalty of Colombia's Attack on the PARC in Ecuador: A New Paradigm
for Balancing Territorial Integriy, Self-Defense and the Duties of Sovereignty, 21 PACE INT'L L. RiV. 137,
137-39 (2009). The U.S. bombed terror camps in Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 as a response to
the attacks on its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. See Tams, supra note 17, at 379-80. Israel
conducted two full-scale wars in Lebanon while expressly arguing that it was fighting against the
hosted terrorist organizations and not against Lebanon. The just cause of its war against
Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 was widely recognized, including by the Secretary General of
the U.N., the U.S. Senate, the G8 states, and the majority of the members of the Security Council.
See U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5489th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5489 (July 14, 2006); G8 St. Petersburg
Summit Declaration, Middle East (July 16, 2006); Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-
General Says 'Immediate Cessation of Hostilities' Needed in Lebanon, Describes Package Aimed at Lasting
Solution, in Security Council Briefing, U.N. Press Release SC/8781 (July 20, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sgsm10570.doc.htm.
26 See Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups, 4 CHI.J. INT'L L. 83,
88-90 (2003).
27 "In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a State, it must be proved that
the State wields overall control over the group." Prosecutor v. Tadi, Case No IT-94-1-A,
Appeals Judgment, 131 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999),
http://www.icty.org/
x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf. See also Tom Ruys, Crossing the Thin Blue line: An
Inquiy into Israel's Recourse to Self-Defense Against HeZbollah, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 265, 277 (2007).
28 See generally Murphy, supra note 22; Steven R. Ratner, Jus Ad Bellum andjus In Bello after September 11,
96 AM.J. 1NT'L L. 905 (2002).
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Third, in calculating the scale of aggression that amounts to an "armed
attack," a question arises whether a cumulative approach is possible. This
question is relevant in the context of terror, which is usually conducted in "small
doses," each of which may fall short of the required critical mass yet taken
together may amount to an "armed attack." (The quantitative threshold itself is
reviewed in the next subsection.) For instance, Israel relied on such an argument
when it attacked Gaza in 2008 (and again in 2014) and Lebanon in 2006 in
response to years of sporadic Hamas and Hezbollah rocket attacks on its
southern and northern cities.29 So too did the U.S. in the Oil Plafor is case.30
Accordingly, legal discourse shows growing acceptance of the victim state's
accounting for the accumulated effect of all single provocative attacks.31
Fourth, the 9/11 attacks amplified the question of whether a victim state
could preempt the armed attack in self-defense, and if so, to what extent. While
anticipatory self-defense is no doubt recognized for the sake of preventing an
imminent armed attack, the legitimacy of preempting a more remote attack is
unclear. Yet it seems that several scholars acknowledge a state's right to preempt
in self-defense future foreseeable attacks that need not be imminent.32 Other
scholars also accept the notion that preventing future attacks may be a legitimate
target when the victim state faces repeated provocations.33
29 On Israel's reliance on the cumulative approach, see David Kretzmer, The Inherent Right to Self-
Defense and Proporionaliy in Jus Ad Bellum, 24 EUR.J. INT'L L. 235, 243-44 (2013).
30 In the Oil Pla'form case, the ICJ used language that seemed to permit accumulating several
incidents into an "armed attack" so as to legitimize the use of force in self-defense. See Oil
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6). A similar suggestive tone is used in Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 1 (Dec. 19) (using the term "armed aggression").
31 See, for example, Roberto Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7 (1980), reprinted in 119801 32 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N; Kretzmer, supra note
29 (maintaining that there is a growing awareness that transnational terrorist attacks present states
with a serious problem and increase the need to acknowledge the cumulative approach); Sloane,
supra note 21; Tams, stpra note 17.
32 See, for example, Thomas Hurka, supra note 19; David Mellow, Counterfactuals and the Proporyonalio
Citerion, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 439 (2006); Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, Optimal WarandJus
Ad Bellum, 93 G.O. L.J. 993 (2005).
33 See, for example, Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620
(1984); MICHAEIL N. SCHMITr, ESSAYS ON LAW AND WAR AT THE FAULT LINES (2012). In our
view, when it comes to conflicts that involve terrorism, the gap between prevention and anticipation
is smaller than contemporary literature suggests. The proponents of anticipation argue that it is
sufficient if the victim state knows for sure that the decision to execute such attacks has been
taken and that the capacities to execute the attack are within reach. See Schmitt, spra, 80-84.
However, as Schmitt rightfully points out, this is typically the case with terror. Terrorist
organizations are in a continuous state of transforming intentions to attack into actions. In this
respect, when the victim state acts to prevent future terror attacks, in practice, it is acting to
intercept a highly probable attack, for almost every preventive strike against a terrorist
organization is a strike in anticipation.
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C. The Threshold Requirement
In contrast to increasing flexibility in interpreting the above conditions
governing resort to force against terrorism, the threshold requirement remains
fairly robust. That is, a full-scale war is not legitimate unless the scale and effect
of the triggering terror attacks is substantial. They must exceed some critical
mass for it to constitute an "armed attack" under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Despite a variety of opinions in this respect, all seem to agree that if the
preceding provocation is minor, it cannot be considered an armed attack and
thus cannot justify a full-scale retaliation.34
In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) required
that, for an attack to constitute an armed attack, it must be of a "significant
scale" or employ "grave forms of the use of force."3 The ICJ upheld that
approach after 9/11 in the case of DRC v. Uganda, considering responses of
states to attacks by irregular forces to be potentially legitimate only if directed
against "large scale attacks."36
The threshold requirement remains firm also beyond the ICJ. The Eritrea
Ethiopia Claims Commission contended that "[l]ocalized border encounters
between small infantry units, even those involving the loss of life, do not
constitute an armed attack for the purpose of the Charter., 37 Further, scholars
such as Cassesse view attacks as falling within Article 51 only if they reflect a
"massive armed aggression ... that imperils its life or government.., the attack
must be of such magnitude that one cannot repel it otherwise. ' 38 Tams concurs:
"[T]he distinction [between armed attack and lesser provocations] as such has
been defended rather vigorously."39
The analysis so far has reviewed the threshold requirement as part of the
"just cause" test. That is, we quantified the scale and effect of the provocation
34 Dinstein justifies a more restrained retaliation by the attacked state. See discussion, infra note 40.
35 "As regards certain particular aspects of the principle in question, it will be necessary to
distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from
other less grave forms." Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. U.S.), 1986 1.C.J. 14, 191 Oune 27). See also W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The
Past and Future ofthe Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 534 (2006).
36 See )RC v. Uganda, supra note 30, at 146-47. See also Oil Plaforms, supra note 30, at 51,
(reaffirming the distinction between "most grave" and "less grave forms" of the use of force).
37 Eri. Eth. Claims Comm'n, Partial Award-Jus Ad Bellum, Ethiopia's Claims 1-8, 4 (The Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and The State of Eritrea), The Hague (Dec. 19, 2005).
38 CASSESE, supra note 18, at 354-55.
39 Tams, supra note 17, at 387. The threshold requirement is not to be confused with other aspects
of self-defense that have been readjusted, such as the accumulation of past events or the inclusion
of future possible attacks. Even if one accepts that sporadic past attacks as well as possible future
ones add up when the legitimacy of the response is considered, the threshold itself remains high.
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that constitutes an "armed attack" under the terms of Article 51. Some scholars,
however, consider this threshold requirement as an ad bellum proporionality rule.
Here too, a full-scale war cannot be deemed ad-bellum proportionate unless the
preceding provocation also exceeds the threshold level.4
In summary, as opposed to the adaptation of other ad bellum
requirements, the threshold requirement seems immutable-remaining stable
regardless of whether it originates in the just-cause examination ("armed attack")
or in the ad bellum proportionality rule. Given that it is very much a self-
imposed norm by stronger states to limit their own defense policy, this
requirement is far from self-evident as rational state action. Because customary
international law reflects states' practice, we turn to rationalizing this relatively
tolerant approach using game theory.
III. A NUMERIC EXAMPLE
The purpose of this section is to capture most of our analysis using a
simplified numerical example. Assume a conflict between a strong state and a
weak one, where the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ("SPE") is based on three
pillars.41
40 The ad bellum proportionality doctrine is notoriously vague; its meaning varies among
international law scholars, only some of whom view it as a threshold test. Franck argues that
determining whether a state has the right to use military force requires considering if such
response is proportionate in the context of a specific provocation. See Franck, supra note 18, at
715, 718, 721. Similarly, Dinstein characterizes it as a reasonableness test of responding to force
by counterforce. Minor or localized attacks can justify on-the-spot responses; only more serious
attacks with massive effects can justify resorting to war. See DINSTEIN, supra note 18, at 261-64.
Kretzmer believes that in conflicts involving terror groups and a liable harboring state, the victim
state may respond with force to prevent future attacks and deter its rivals. Accordingly,
proportionality weighs the scale of the preceding attacks, including their accumulated impact
combined with the scale of future attacks if not prevented, against the intensity of the response.
See Kretzmer, supra note 29, at 273-76. To some extent our analysis may also fit the "tit for tat"
proportionality test, in the sense that we are exploring the scale of the provocation that legitimizes
a full-scale war in response. See id. at 279-82 (noting reactions to the conflict between Israel and
Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, undertaken in response to the latter's provocation).
41 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a kind of perfection of Nash Equilibrium. Nash
Equilibrium is a set of strategies, one for each player, from which unilateral deviation makes
neither better off. In other words, if Player 2 adheres to her equilibrium strategy, Player l's best
response is to play according to his own equilibrium strategy as well. This basic concept of game
theory has several drawbacks, one of which is the multiplicity of solutions. If there is more than
one equilibrium, it is hard to predict which one will prevail. Consequently, several refining
concepts have been developed over the years, leaving out equilibria that are for some reason
unlikely. Perhaps the most known screening criterion is subgame perfection, which rules out
unreliable equilibria. Specifically, an equilibrium may consist of conditional strategies; for example,
"if Player 1 provokes you, wage a full scale war against it." If Player 1 does not provoke Player 2
in equilibrium, this scenario should never materialize, thus Player 2 technically never deviates
from its prescribed equilibrium strategy. However, subgame perfection asks more than that. It is
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First, there is a status quo of low terror attacks induced by the weak state
and suffered by the strong one. In each period of this low-intensity conflict,
terror is causing the strong state damage of 20. This status quo also reflects
some kind of a "red line." If the terror inflicted by the weak state does not
exceed this level, the strong state contains it and maintains the low-intensity
conflict. Within such a low-intensity conflict, the parties infinitely witness a cycle
of low-scale conflict that is not expected to escalate into a full-scale war,
provided that the red line is not crossed.
Second, the strong state threatens to wage a full-scale war should the weak
one provoke it by increasing the terror level above 20. If indeed such war takes
place, for whatever reason, the strong state becomes less tolerant in the future.
The new redline is lowered, even to, say, damage of 0 in all subsequent periods.
The post-war lower tolerance reflects the "returns" demanded by the strong
state on its costly war "investment." A full-scale war reduces the future level of
terror by either undermining the weak state's capabilities or by increasing
deterrence.
Third, if the weak side provokes the strong state, but the latter does not
make good on its threat to wage a full-scale war, deterrence is eroded, and the
weak state increases its attacks. The strong state becomes more tolerant, and the
new red line in all subsequent periods is higher (instead of 20, it moves to, say,
30).
To prove this is indeed an SPE, one needs to show that under no
circumstances is a party better off deviating from its prescribed equilibrium
strategy. The weak state is worse off (by assumption) fighting a full-scale war
against the strong state; therefore, given the threat it faces, it should never cross
the red line, whatever it is. The strong state can save 20 in each period,
presumably over an infinite period, if it wages war without prior provocation.
Assuming that the present value multiplier is 10, the overall benefits of war
amount to 10*20=200.42 Let the costs of war be 300. Deviation by the strong
state, then, is not cost-effective. It is irrational to invest 300 in order to save 200.
Therefore, the weak state will maintain the terror level at 20, and the strong state
will maintain the low intensity conflict. This is the equilibrium path.
not enough not to deviate from a strategy never triggered; Player 2 should adhere to its strategy
assuming it will be triggered. If Player 2 is better off not waging war when provoked, then an
equilibrium based on the assumption of nonprovocation is unreliable, because the other party is
aware of that fact. Thus, SPE retains only reliable equilibria, in the sense that all players shall act
as prescribed by their strategies even if some element of their strategies is not expected to be
tested.
42 War prevents damage of 20 in each period, infinitely. However, future benefits are discounted
periodically by a discount rate of, say, 1/9. When the damage from terror is summed across all
periods infinitely, it converges to the product of 20 and the "present value multiplier," which,
with some manipulation of the discount rate, can be expressed as (1+1/9)/(1/9)=10.
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In order to substantiate the SPE, one needs to verify whether the strong
state will live up to its threat when provoked by the weak one (although such
provocation is not expected to take place in the equilibrium path). Suppose,
therefore, that some provocation of the strong state above the red line is
imminent. If the strong state wages a full-scale war (as prescribed by its
equilibrium strategy) its overall costs are 300: these are the costs of war "today"
plus the costs of terror in each future period (which is presumably 0)." If, on the
other hand, the strong state decides not to go to war, it shall suffer terror of 30
in each future period, on top of the costs of the current provocation. With the
same present value multiplier (10), total costs in damage amount to more than
300. Therefore, the threat to wage war when provoked is indeed credible.
However, renegotiation between the parties following provocation can
change the cost-effectiveness of war for the strong state. The parties can agree
to "skip war" and return to the original status quo ante, where the terror level
was 20 (this is "weak renegotiation perfection" of SPE, following Farrell and
Maskin 44). Clearly, the weak state would agree: avoiding war with a much
stronger rival is axiomatically better for it. As to the strong state, if it decides to
avoid war in light of this "new agreement," its periodic costs decrease to 20,
which amounts to 200 in present value terms (and its total costs are a bit higher,
accounting for the costs of the current provocation). Hence war, which costs
300, becomes cost-ineffeclive. A rational strong state would thus probably also
agree to resorting to the status quo ante and merely containing the
provocation.45
Such conditions lead to both sides deviating from their equilibrium
strategies: anticipating successful renegotiation, the weak state provokes the
strong one and crosses the red line of 20; the strong state restrains itself and
does not retaliate with full-scale war as "promised"; the weak state does not take
advantage of its rival's restrained reaction (it agrees not to punish the strong
state for violating its commitment to go to war and avoids further escalation of
terror). All three pillars of the equilibrium, respectively, are violated. Therefore,
the original equilibrium-in which the terror level is 20-is not renegotiation-
proof. The underlying equilibrium path, whereby an intolerant strategy keeps
43 It should be noted that even if a full-scale war against the weak State reduces the costs of terror in
the future to 0, it does not refer to the influence of war over the conduct of unmodeled
exogenous actors, such as other states or organizations.
44 Farrell & Maskin, supra note 10, at 330-31.
45 Arguably, the weak state has an ongoing incentive to deviate from the status quo, with the
anticipation of another successful renegotiation for similar reasons. Because the strong state
knows that, one can argue that it might exercise its threat after all-an outcome the weak state
seeks to avoid. In the proposed argument, we deal with this complexity by using a more refined
perfection criterion than the one presented in this section.
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terror at a (low) level of 20, is implausible. The threshold ad bellum rule that
forbids waging a full-scale war in response to low-scale terror reflects this
dynamic.
Suppose, alternately, that the terror level in each period is 100 instead of
20. The SPE is similarly based on the same three pillars: so long as the weak
state does not cross the red line, the strong one keeps the conflict in its low-
intensity form. However, if that line is crossed, the strong state threatens to
wage a full-scale war. If a full-scale war erupts, for any reason, the subsequent
new red line is lowered to 70. If the red line is crossed, however, and the strong
state refrains from exercising its threat, deterrence is eroded and the new red line
increases to 120. Showing why this is also an SPE tracks our first example.
In these circumstances, if the weak state provokes the strong one,
returning to the status quo ante would not make the latter better off. Recall that
war costs 300, and following it, terror decreases to 70 in each period. Thus, the
overall cost of sticking to the equilibrium strategy is 1000 (periodical terror level
of 70 times the present value multiplier of 10 is 700, whereas the cost of war is
300). On the other hand, deviating from the equilibrium strategy according to
the concept of "weak renegotiation" restores the original terror level in each
period, 100, which also comes to 1000 over time-and even more, if the costs of
provocation are accounted for. The strong state has no incentive to deviate from
its subgame perfect equilibrium strategy. It has threatened to go to war if a terror
level of 100 is crossed and is expected to do so. Anticipating the failure of
renegotiation, the weak state will accordingly not provoke the strong one by
inflicting terror damage above the red line. So the original equilibrium-where
the terror level was 100 in the status quo-is indeed weakly renegotiation-proof.
The underlying equilibrium path, whereby a tolerant strategy sustains terror at
100, is plausible. The relatively tolerant threshold ad bellum rule in the context
of such unequal conflicts reflects this equilibrium.
Given these two numeric variations, we speculate that this is why the terror
level strong states experience in reality reflects the higher figure (100) rather than
the lower (20). It also explains why low levels of terror cannot amount to an
armed attack and justify a full-scale war by the victim state. Given the possible
benefits of an intolerant trigger strategy, however, strong states can
hypothetically benefit from credibly disabling the weak, terror-sponsoring state's
ability to negotiate. High transaction costs can cause negotiation between the
parties to fail, and indirectly perform as an exogenous commitment mechanism.
If renegotiation is frustrated, the SPE-which is based on an intolerant trigger
strategy-becomes renegotiation-proof. Thus, in terms of our numeric example,
the strong state will suffer terror in the amount of 20, instead of 100, in each
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period. Clearly this makes it better off and may induce it to violate the ad bellum
threshold rule.46
IV. MODEL OF UNEQUAL BILATERAL CONFRONTATION
We now turn to presenting our argument in more detail. We start by
discussing an unequal conflict in a one-shot game. In this conflict, the parties
face one single interaction: an unequal bilateral confrontation where the weak
side uses terrorism indirectly against its stronger counterpart. We then move to
the more realistic scenario of a game with repeated interactions. The purpose is
to introduce the concept of credible threats and refine the SPE analysis.
A. One-Shot Confrontation
Assume a conflict between a strong state, S, and a weak state, W7, with
complete and symmetric information. The conflict can be of low intensity, in
which W uses guerilla tactics or terrorism against S either directly or via a proxy.
And S, the strong state, confines its response to limited reprisals that do not
escalate to full-scale war. Alternatively, the conflict can be of high intensity;
namely, a full-scale war between the two states.
Due to its military inferiority, state W always prefers to avoid a full-scale
war. Technically speaking, this means that the costs of going to war against S are
higher than any alternative strategy that averts such war. In a low-intensity
conflict, hostile actions against S serve V's long term interests, so we assume W
derives benefits from inflicting damage on S. Therefore, W prefers the net terror
damage suffered by S (that is, after accounting for the counter-terror measures
taken by ,5) to be as high as possible."
Denote the net terror level that S suffers by t, and assume that W controls
t. It can restrain or encourage terror activity against S by either restraining or
assisting the terrorist organizations it harbors. Accordingly, W "chooses" the
46 We assume that transaction costs are exogenous. Naturally, they are not. The strong state benefits
from high transaction costs and may try to commit to keep them high (for instance, by electing
hardline leaders). The international community, on the other hand, is composed of rational states
whose motivation and ability to intervene can also be affected by the parties. This analysis,
however, is suppressed in our work because it is ancillary to our research interests. This Article
aims to rationalize the relatively tolerant threshold ad belium rule, as well as to predict its level
and when it will be ignored. We show that only tolerant strategies are renegotiation-proof when
transaction costs are low (which explains the tolerant threshold requirement); intolerant ones are
renegotiation-proof only when transaction costs are high (which predicts when this rule may be
violated). This is true, arguably, irrespective of how the level of transaction costs is determined.
47 Of course, this is merely a reduced form. The weak state may not benefit per se from terrorizing
the strong one. It might target the strong state for terror to achieve ideological, religious, or
territorial gains.
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level of terror damage, t, to be suffered by its rival, although it may not have the
ability to fully and absolutely control t. It could be that the terror organization-
albeit directed by W--is not completely subject to its authority. To reflect that,
assume some minimum level of terror damage, t, which takes place even in the
face of maximal effort by W and S to prevent terror. Clearly, it could be that
t = 0, but this need not be the case. Therefore, t captures some "constant" level
of terror suffered by S for which Wcannot be held responsible.
During the course of a low-intensity conflict, S observes IW's actions and
thus can predict the imminent net level of terror, t, before it actually
materializes. In contrast to its rival, S naturally prefers t to be as low as possible.
The only way, however, for S to prevent the expected net terror damage is by
waging a full-scale war against W (recall that t already accounts for low-scale
counter terror measures undertaken by S). In such case, S would have to endure
the costs of war, which we denote by t. Note that in this case, the assumption is
that the terror damage does not materialize. 48 Naturally, we assume that t > t
which means that the cost of war is higher, probably much higher, than the
lowest terror level that W can induce.
Thus, the one-shot confrontation is a simple two-stage sequential game. In
the first stage, state W "sets" the expected level of net terror, t (but it does not
materialize yet). In the second stage, S, which observes V's actions and thus can
predict t, has a binary decision. It can either endure the net terror damage, t,
thereby maintaining a low intensity conflict with state Wwho benefits from t; or
S can elect to escalate the conflict into a full-scale war and bear its costs, t (with
W suffering enormous damage).49
The one-shot game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE): W
chooses t = t; S maintains a low intensity conflict if t < t, and otherwise
switches to full-scale war (note that the SPE strategy by S addresses all possible
actions by W, including the ones that are not expected to take place). On the
equilibrium path, thus, there is a low intensity conflict, where the threshold for
launching a large-scale retaliation by S is rather high: t.
To see why this is indeed an SPE, consider first the strategy of W. As the
weaker state, it always prefers to avoid a direct war against S. Subject to that
constraint, it prefers t to be as high as possible. W's choice of the maximal terror
level that still allows avoiding war (t = t), therefore, maximizes its well-being.
48 The concept of war that fully prevents the imminent terror level is technically convenient. It could
be, of course, that war does not prevent terror in full. The idea, however, is that the terror damage
is absorbed in the costs of war borne by country S, yielding an overall damage level oft.
49 This model is in fact a simple entry-deterrent model, as used by Goldsmith and Posner. See
,generaly Goldsmith & Posner, A Tbeogy of Customary International Law, supra note 5. However, the
decision of the weak state is not binary (whether or not to "enter") but continuous.
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Hence, it cannot profitably deviate from its equilibrium strategy: lower terror
undermines its goals, and higher terror is expected to trigger a full-scale war.
3', on the other hand, cannot profit from war if t <_ t, because in this case
the cost of war outweighs its benefits (namely, the terror damage it eliminates).
However, it will exercise its threat if the terror damage is expected to exceed the
costs of war; that is, if t > t. Therefore, the expected critical mass of terror,
above which S wages a full-scale war against W, is in fact its cost of war, t.
What would happen if S tried to impose a lower, less tolerant threshold?
Assume that the trigger for a full-scale war is t. Namely, if W does not do
everything in its power to reduce terrorism to its minimal controlled level, then S
will retaliate with a full-scale war. S will not deviate from this strategy on the
equilibrium path because it reduces its damage from terror to a minimum. Due
to V's military inferiority, it also will not deviate, instead setting the terror level
at t. Therefore these strategies represent an equilibrium under which S is better
off. It is not, however, an SPE and thus is not expected to happen in practice. It
is based on a noncredible strategy by S, whereby if W provokes it and increases
terror above t (but below E), S wages a cost-inefficient full-scale war. In other
words, this equilibrium is based on a dubious assumption, whereby W believes
that S would launch a cost-ineffective war. This presumption renders the whole
concept of an intolerant trigger strategy implausible.
Nevertheless, this notion does not fully explain why strong states do not
use intolerant strategies more often in unequal confrontations. Specifically,
international conflicts are almost always dynamic and repeated. In this case, the
"returns" from war should also take into account future benefits in the form of
terror attacks that the war can prevent. In these circumstances, the strong state
can more plausibly build a credible threat. If so, our original question regarding
the rationalization of the threshold rule remains unanswered.
B. Dynamic Confrontation
An intolerant trigger strategy by the strong state cannot establish an SPE in
the single confrontation scenario because it relies on noncredible threats. This
section shows that in an infinitely repeated game, almost any set of payoffs can
be supported in an SPE. 0 Namely, the strong state can build credible threats
that are supported in equilibrium.'
50 See also Quan Wen, A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games, 69 REV. ECON. STun. 493
(2002).
51 Credible threats play a crucial role in asymmetric conflicts that involve terrorism. A clear example
is the explicit Turkish threat against Syria in 1998. Turkey demanded that the PKK leader be
expelled from his shelter in Syria and that Syria immediately cease its support of PKK.
Determining the threat to be credible and understanding the grave implications of its
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The threat of a full-scale war is credible if and only if waging it when
provoked is cost-effective for the strong state. This happens when the benefits
of war for the strong state are higher than its costs. The costs of war in the
dynamic formation are the same as in the one-shot scenario, t. And yet, the
benefits differ. The benefits of war in a one-shot game reflect the terror that war
prevents in that period; in the repeated game, the benefits of war also account
for the terror the full-scale war prevents in all subsequent periods.
For instance, assume two periods of confrontation between S and W, both
of whom possess perfect foresight. If S chooses not to go to war and maintains
a low intensity confrontation, it suffers t in each period. If it goes to war, it
suffers t = 300 in the first period and t = 30 in the second one. To enable
inter-temporal comparison of values, denote the periodical discount factor of
state S by 6. Let 6 = 0.9.52
If S contains the terror attacks, it suffers t + 0.9t.53 If S wages a full-scale
war, it suffers t + 0.9t.5 4 Thus, S is indifferent between both options if
t + 0.9t = t + 0.9t, which implies that t - 172. Namely, if the terror level in
each period is 172, the costs of war equal its benefits. If the terror level in each
period is higher than 172, war will be preferable to the low intensity conflict.
Accordingly, if the terror level in each period is lower than 172, the low-intensity
conflict alternative is preferable to S.
Figure 1 generalizes the above example to any repeated confrontation game
with two features. First, without war, the current level of terror, t, remains in
subsequent periods; second, following war, the terror level decreases to the
minimum, t:
FIGURE 1: THE INDIFFERENCE THRESHOLD
t
consummation, Assad complied with the demands in full. See Zisser, supra note 16, at 35-37; Kim
& Yun, supra note 25, at 73. Another example concerns Pakistan's leader, General Musharaf, who
explained that Pakistan's cessation of relations with the Taliban was purely the result of an
American ultimatum to join its War on Terror or suffer the consequences. See Riedel, stopra note
15, at 37. The self-imposed Libyan and Iranian cessation of their nuclear programs in 2003 is
another example of a credible threat of war by a strong state toward a weaker one. See generaly
Oscar Schachter, The Eixtraterritorial Use of Force against Terrorist Bases, 11 Hous. J. INT'l. L. 309
(1989).
52 The "discount factor" equals 1/(1+discount rate). Thus, the discount rate here is 1/9.
53 S actually suffers two periods of terror level t. The terror in the second period is multiplied by 8
so that it equals 0.9t in present terms. Therefore, overall terror damage is t + 0.9t = 1.9t.
54 If S instigates war, it will suffer war's cost in the first period t. In the second subsequent period, S
will suffer the minimal terror level, being reduced to t as the benefit of war, calculated in its
present value to be 0.9t. The total cost of terror in both periods then is t + 0.9t.
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If t < F, the costs of war are higher than its benefits. If t > t, the costs of
war are lower than its benefits. Accordingly, F is the indifference threshold where the
costs of war equal its benefits."5 As for W, a full-scale war against S makes it
worse off regardless of the alternative. Therefore, we retain our assumption that
W aims to maximize the terror level while avoiding a full-scale war with S.56
The game remains exactly the same, only that instead of playing it in a
single period, it is played infinitely. Namely, in each period, W chooses a level of
terror t, and S, who observes that, decides whether to contain it or wage a full-
scale war. The SPE we focus on in this dynamic game is similar to the one-shot
game. 7 Both parties "agree" on a certain level of terror. The strong side backs
this level up with an appropriate trigger strategy. The trigger materializes if W
provokes S by deviating and increasing terror beyond the initially "agreed"
level.58 The difference, however, is that in the repeated game scenario, the
equilibrium also accounts for future periods.
To establish an SPE, the following conditions must hold:
(1) The costs of war for S should be higher than its benefits from an
unprovoked war. Thus, S will not wage war against W when not provoked.
(2) The costs of war for S should be lower than its benefits from a
provoked war. Thus, S will wage war against W when provoked.
(3) The costs of war for W are higher than any possible benefit. Thus, W
will not provoke S.
Figure 2 presents a possible set of SPE equilibria. The horizontal axis
describes imminent levels of terror damage S suffers in any given period; the
vertical axis describes the periodical terror level in the following future periods,
given the parties' strategies.
55 Note that t is the current terror level for which S is indifferent between going to war and
subsequently reducing the terror level to minimum, and not going to war (thereby maintaining the
current terror level). If the horizon of future confrontations is infinite, then:
(1) F = &t + (1 - 5)i.
Namely, the indifference threshold is a combination of the minimal terror level, t, and the costs
of war, t. It is positively correlated with the costs of war, t, the minimum terror level, t, and the
discount factor, 6.
56 Formally, it means W is better off sponsoring no terror at all than suffering the costs of war, and
"benefitting" from the maximal terror level, F, afterwards in all periods.
57 We argue that an SPE can be formed above the indifference threshold, t, and also below it. To
that end, both assumptions of the dynamic confrontation in the example above are relaxed:
without war, the current terror level may change in the future and, following war, the terror level
is not necessarily minimal.
58 Naturally, we are not arguing that these strategies are the only ones that can establish an SPE. We
do argue, however, that these strategies deserve special attention, because unequal and indirectly
managed conflicts in reality are often characterized by similar strategies: a trigger strategy by the
strong side, with constant attacks by the weak side.
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FIGURE 2: A POSSIBLE SPE IN AN INFINITELY REPEATED GAME
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The terror level on the equilibrium path can be anything between t (below
which is impossible by assumption) and t (above which war is preferable
irrespective of any future periods, as shown in the previous section). Thus,
assume that the terror level in equilibrium is some t within this range. If the
parties remain loyal to their strategies (which, by the definition of an equilibrium,
they are expected to do), this status quo will persist indefinitely. Namely, in each
period W will cause net terror at the level t, and S will contain it without
escalating the conflict any further. This is exactly why the equilibrium path is in
fact any point (above D on the 45-degree line.
If, however, W deviates and intends to raise the terror level beyond t, then
S faces two alternatives: it can keep up its strategy and launch a full-scale war, or
it can avoid war contrary to its predefined threat. If it chooses war, the terror
level in subsequent periods is reduced as a result due to W's diminished capacity
and S's increased deterrent effect. The level of terror in all future periods
(depicted by the vertical axis) is lowered to what the "Reward Path" describes:
the future post-war level of terror that corresponds to the present, imminent
pre-war level of terror. Clearly, the extent to which the post-war terror level falls
below the current one depends upon the intensity of the power inequality
between the states, among other exogenous elements. Greater military inequality
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results in lower levels of post-war terror damage. Naturally, therefore, the reward
path in equilibrium can take many forms, of which Figure 2 displays only one.59
If, however, contrary to S's threat, war is avoided, then W punishes S by
increasing the terror level in all future periods to that described by the
"Punishment Path": future periodical levels of terror from which S will suffer in
the absence of its full-scale war retaliation for a current deviation by W. It
reflects the erosion in S's deterrent effect when its threats are shown not to be
credible. Clearly, the punishment path can also take many forms, of which
Figure 2 displays only one.6 °
For example, Point A on the 45-degree line depicts a possible equilibrium
path below the indifference threshold, T. If the level of terror in a certain period
is A, the terror level in all subsequent periods is also A (on the equilibrium
path). This status quo also marks the "red line" which W must not cross.
Otherwise, S threatens to wage a full-scale war against it. If W deviates and
increases the terror level beyond that described by A, S can either respond with
a full-scale war according to its threat and reduce the future periodical terror
level to B, or avoid war, prove its threat to be empty, and therefore induce
punishment in the form of W, increasing the future periodical terror level to C.
Note that if war takes place, S is "rewarded" by a lower terror level, and
that new terror level-which manifests a lower tolerance by S for terror-
becomes the new status quo.61 The lower post-war terror levels are the "returns"
S receives for its "investment" in a full-scale war.62 Therefore, the post-war
59 In fact, the reward path describes the maximal rewardpath for which unprovoked war is not cost-
effective. That is, if the post-war terror level is lower than the reward path presented in Figure 2,
S is better off waging a full-scale war even if not provoked, in violation of the first condition of
the SPE.
60 Given the reward path, the punishment path displays the minimal punishment path for which
provoked war is cost-effective. That is, if the "post-bluff" terror level is lower than the
punishment path presented in Figure 2, then S is better off not carrying out its threat when
provoked, in violation of the second condition of the SPE. Each possible reward path (out of
infinite possibilities) has infinite corresponding punishment paths that together form an SPE. The
punishment path in Figure 2 is the lowest among all possible punishment paths in all SPEs of the
sort we describe (the lower envelope). The reason, of course, is that the reward path in Figure 2 is
the maximal one-it exhibits the lowest possible post-war terror level in an SPE.
61 It should be noted that war could be launched whether or not following provocation by W.
However, a strategy that reflects SPE, by definition, requires that an unprovoked war always be
cost-inefficient.
62 Following the war in Afghanistan, the anti-American AI-Qaeda terror level dropped dramatically,
as was the case following the 2006 israeli war in Lebanon. See Amos Hard, Fiveyears after war,
Israel-Lebanon border is quieter than ever, HAARETZ (July 12, 2011), available at
http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/2.244/five-years-after-war-israel-lebanon-border-is-quieter-than-
ever-1.372727; Jean-Loup Samaan, From War to Deterrence? Israel-HeZbollah Conflict Since 2006, U.S.
ARMdiY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE (2014), available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/
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(periodical) terror level sets in fact a new red line, t, as marked by point B on the
"reward path." The above trigger strategy applies to the new red line exactly as
to the old one.
On the other hand, if W deviates from the equilibrium path (by escalating
the terror level above the red line) and S fails to act on its threat, deterrence is
eroded. S is "punished" for its empty threats. Hence the higher "post-bluff'
terror levels 3 suffers as depicted by the "punishment path." Accordingly, the
new red line is marked by point C on the "punishment path," exhibiting S's
higher tolerance. The above trigger strategy applies to the new red line exactly as
to the old one."
The vertical difference between points C and B represents the future
periodical benefits of a provoked war. It is the level of terror damage that war can
prevent in each future period, after prior provocation by W. The vertical
difference between points A and B represents the future periodical benefits of
unprovoked war. It is the level of terror damage that war can prevent in each
future period, without prior provocation by W. Because this is an unprovoked
war, its benefits do not include the saved punishment; not going to war when
unprovoked is not expected to entail punishment (recall that the punishment
reflects the erosion of deterrence, which is relevant only if a threat proves
empty).
In the above example, points A, B, and C form an SPE equilibrium
because the following conditions apply. First, the benefits of an unprovoked war
are not higher than the cost of war (the first SPE criterion).64 Hence, S is never
pdffiles/publl98.pdf. Indeed, at least in the short run, this is also the result of destroying the
terror infrastructure. However, terror organizations gradually restore their capabilities, and thus
long run quiet is gained mainly by the deterrence effect of the full-scale war (as mentioned, this
model does not take account of the influence of war over external parties. However, if these
expected influences, whether harmful or beneficial, are foreseeable, they can be incorporated into
the calculation of the expected cost of war).
63 India's slow and mild response to Pakistani -sponsored terrorism, including surrender to hijackers
of an Air-India jet, arguably eroded deterrence and contributed to the increase in anti-Indian
terror. See Chellaney, supra note 15, at 97-99. The Israeli case also demonstrates this "drizzling
effect." Sporadic rocket attacks on both its northern (by Hezbollah) and southern borders (by
Hamas and Islamic Jihad) gradually increased in frequency and volume until a critical mass was
reached and a large military campaign launched to restore deterrence.
64 Formally, points A, B, and C comprise an SPE equilibrium since the following conditions apply,
as reflected by this inequality:
(2) A + (C - B) >_ A + -(A - B).
The inequality on the right, t > A + k (A - B), corresponds to the first condition of the
1-6
equilibrium: the left-hand term is the cost of war; the right-hand term is the benefit from an
unprovoked war. The latter has two components: the present imminent level of terror that war
absorbs, A, and the level of terror that war prevents in each future period, A - B, multiplied by a
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tempted to go to war when not provoked. Second, the benefits from a provoked
war are at least as high as the cost of war (the second SPE criterion).65 Hence, S
is never tempted to forego its threats. (Generally, the reward and punishment
paths are constructed such that the first two conditions of the SPE hold for any
level of terror.66) The third condition of the SPE, inducing state W not to
provoke S, is implied. Given that its stronger rival punishes it for deviation, W
not only suffers extreme costs of war but is deterred into "settling" for a lower
terror level in future periods.
A second example can be found, given a different benchmark terror level,
as reflected by point D in Figure 2. This time, the elected terror level is above
the indifference threshold, T. If W deviates from the equilibrium path implied by
D, and S responds with a full-scale war, then the post-war terror level is reduced
to E on the reward path. If S fails to respond with a full-scale war to
provocation by W, the terror level is at least as high as before, at point D,
because the punishment path coincides with the equilibrium path in this area.
The current level of terror is high enough to make provoked war cost-effective.
In this case, thus, no actual punishment of S by W is needed in order to induce
it to wage a full-scale war when provoked.67
In conclusion, as implied by Figure 2, any terror level can be supported in
an SPE. Specifically, an intolerant trigger strategy, which is based on a very low
threshold, can be supported in an SPE. Every point on the 45-degree line is a
combination of rewards and punishments, such that the three SPE conditions
attain. Low levels of terror can be supported in an SPE because there can always
present value multiplier, (recall that 6 is the periodical discount factor). Therefore, an
unprovoked war is not cost-effective.
.6
65 Recall equation (2), A + -- (C - B) t A + -- (A - B). The inequality on the left,
1-8S 1-8
A + - - (C - B) - t, corresponds to the second condition of the equilibrium: again, the right-
hand term is the cost of war; the left-hand term is the benefit from a provoked war. The latter has
two components: the present imminent level of terror that war absorbs, A, and the level of terror
that war prevents in each future period, C- B, multiplied by the present value multiplier.
Therefore, a provoked war is cost-effective.
66 Note that the vertical gap between the punishment and reward paths increases as the level of
terror on the equilibrium path decreases. The intuition is simple. The benefits of a provoked war
are the terror damage it manages to prevent, imminently and in the future. These benefits must be
at least t for the threat of war upon provocation to be credible (condition (2) of the SPE). Hence,
when the imminent benefits of war (as captured by the terror level on the equilibrium path)
decrease, the future benefits (as captured by the gap between the punishment and the reward
paths) must increase, so that the benefits of war remain at least t.
67 Points D and E form an equilibrium because all three criteria of forming an SPE are met.
Accordingly, the following conditions apply (in equality):
(3) D + (D - E) t (D D ).
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be a high enough punishment (if war is avoided) to render a provoked war cost-
effective. So, if indeed such a strategy can practically eradicate terror, why do
strong countries so uncommonly use it? Why do strong states rarely apply
intolerant and apparently effective strategies in a manner that would reshape the
ad bellum threshold rule of customary international law?
V. RENEGOTIATION-PROOF EQUILIBRIA
A central problem with the set of SPEs discussed above is indeterminacy.
Any level of terror can be supported in equilibrium, including very low ones.
The ad bellum threshold rule, however, implies that states practice relatively
tolerant approaches towards terror. The above analysis does not make the high-
terror equilibria (based on tolerant trigger strategies) more likely than the low-
terror ones (based on intolerant trigger strategies). It seems that, at least in
customary international law, states choose tolerant strategies for the most part.
The final phase of our argument offers a rational basis for this refined
choice of strong states and the consequent tolerant ad bellum threshold rule. In
fact, the proposed argument even assists in predicting the less common
occasions in which states are likely to violate the ad bellum threshold rule and
apply an intolerant strategy. In explaining the likelihood of tolerant strategies, we
use renegotiation-proof refinement criteria, following Farrell and Maskin. This
analysis of foreseeable renegotiation filters out intolerant trigger strategies as
implausible.68
A. Weak Renegotiation-Proofness
An equilibrium strategy is subgame perfect only if its underlying threat is
credible: if called upon to carry out a threat, neither party wishes to unilateralJy
back out of the strategy prescribed to it. Thus, when provoked, S is better off
waging a full-scale war against W, although it is a costly action. The fact that
such punishment harms both parties, however, may encourage bilateral deviation
from the SPE strategies if it makes both parties better off. This refinement is
also known as Pareto perfection.69
Renegotiation perfection has two refinement levels. We start with the one
that is referred to as "weak" by Farrell and Maskin.70 According to the
predefined strategy, if both states "cooperate" in agreeing (tacitly or otherwise)
on some terror level, and yet W deviates, S should wage a full-scale war.
68 See Farrell & Maskin, siupra note 10.
69 See Eric Van Damme, Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria (1991); Drew Fudenberg &Jean
Tirole, Game Theory (1991).
70 Farrell & Maskin, supra note 10.
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However, because war harms both parties, if they can successfully communicate,
either may propose to the other to return to the status quo ante, ignoring the
one-time provocation. Such a proposal can be Pareto superior to adhering to the
SPE strategies. If both parties are expected to mutually deviate from their
prescribed strategy as a result of foreseeable renegotiation, the underlying
original SPE is not weakly renegotiation-proof (and thus implausible).
Accordingly, all the players' strategies not resistant to such renegotiation should
be filtered out in advance from the set of SPEs. This refinement would
foreground the implausibility of intolerant strategies that accounts for the
relatively tolerant nature of the ad bellum threshold requirement.
Consider the SPE that is based on an intolerant trigger strategy, as
displayed in Figure 2. It originally has three possible paths of terror: the
equilibrium path terror level, A; the corresponding reward path terror level, B;
and the relevant punishment path terror level, C. As we showed in the previous
section, if W deviates from the equilibrium path by planning to increase terror
above A, S is better off pursuing its prescribed strategy, given that W does so as
well. However, both parties are better off avoiding the war (and its subsequent
post-war terror path) and returning to the original equilibrium path. That is, S
would agree to look the other way "just this once" and avoid going to full-scale
war against W despite its provocation (such a war would have brought terror
level to B on the reward path). W, in return, would agree not to "punish" S,
namely, not to take advantage of the latter's containment reaction to the
provocation, and also return to the original equilibrium path. (Note that such
punishment would have increased terror level to C, on the punishment path.).
This renegotiation leads to Pareto improvement. W is clearly better off: it
manages both to avoid a costly war as well as the lower level of terror followed
by it (recall that higher terror level is in W's best interest). As for S, its original
incentive to wage full-scale war is conditional on the benefits of the provoked
war. These benefits largely depend on the future periodical gap between the
punishing and rewarding levels of terror [(C - B) in Figure 2]. Clearly therefore,
if S is not punished for not waging a war when provoked, a full-scale war
becomes cost-ineffective. Thus, S would also be better off not carrying out its
threat and returning to the status quo ante. Therefore, this SPE is implausible
since it is not a weakly Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium ("RPE").
Generally speaking, such renegotiation would be successful if and only if
the minimal punishment path is higher than the equilibrium path. In Figure 2,
the minimal punishment path is indeed higher than the equilibrium path below
the indifference threshold, T, and it is not higher than the equilibrium path above
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the indifference threshold. Consequently, any SPE in the interval [t, E) is not weakly
RPE and any SPE in the interval [t, ] is weakly RPE.7 1
The intuition is simple. When the level of terror damage is relatively low,
there is not much to gain by war. Even the "best" war that is expected to
eliminate terror may not be a sufficient incentive for S to carry out its threat
when needed. In this case, only if S is punished for false threats will war become
cost-effective and thus ex ante credible. That is, only if war prevents more severe
terror attacks than currently are suffered will it become cost-effective. Any actual
punishment, however, leaves some wedge for this simple, and very specific, so-
called "weak renegotiation." This renegotiation can only succeed if both parties
have some benefit to "sell" to the rival party. These benefits will render the
initial strategy inferior compared to the successful conclusion of the negotiation.
S, the stronger state, can offer W to skip the destructive war. W offers in return
to refrain from punishing S if the latter does not carry out its threat. As a result,
renegotiation will be successfully concluded only when a punishment is relevant.
In Figure 2, this applies to all points below the threshold level T. Insofar as the
original SPE must be supported by punishing S, then both sides have something
to gain by resorting to the original status quo, instead of going through a costly
war.
On the other hand, when the equilibrium path overlaps the minimal
punishment path, the terror level is relatively high. Hence, the benefit of a full-
scale war for S exceeds the alternative suggestion, namely, returning to the status
quo and containing the provocation. In this case, the offer to restore the status
quo ante is simply not enough to discourage S from carrying out its threat to
wage a full-scale war. The underlying SPE is therefore sustainable.
This simple refinement tool provides our main explanation for the tolerant
nature of the threshold requirement. Although we have shown that intolerant
trigger strategies are credible and can theoretically eradicate terror, they are not
commonly used in reality because such strategies are not robust to the weakly
renegotiation-proof criterion. Hence, the customary ad bellum threshold rule,
72
which reflects this practice, is not an intolerant one.
B. Strong Renegotiation-Proofness
The concept of weakly RPE suffers, in our context, from three downsides.
First, while it manages to narrow the set of terror levels that are sustainable in
71 See proof in the Appendix, infra.
72 This argument is restricted only to the SPE based on the specific trigger strategies described
above. It does not purport to eliminate, based on the weak RPE refinement criterion, any
equilibrium whose path displays relatively low levels of terror.
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equilibrium, the remaining scope is still rather large. Indeed, this perfection
criterion explains why a low threshold rule is not sustainable; however, it cannot
give a more precise prediction as to the actual threshold rule.73
Second, the weak renegotiation refinement is restricted to a very specific
kind of renegotiation, in which only one proposal is on the table: returning to
the status quo ante. This limitation, of course, is avoidable. If the parties indeed
can communicate following a provocation, they are not necessarily bounded by
the status quo ante (despite its status as a focal point in international relations).
Third, one may argue that ruling out an SPE by weak renegotiation
perfection is reasonable only if the provocation is isolated or mild or
inadvertent, or if the new arrangement it offers can somehow be backed up by
the international community. Otherwise, despite the promise to return to the
status quo, S may wage a full-scale war after all. The reason, arguably, is that
nothing will stop W from repeating the "provocation and renegotiation" routine
in the future as well. So, in fact, when repeated provocations are expected, the
option of restoring the status quo ante is not realistic. In such a case, S may
prefer a full-scale war after all."
To address these concerns, we employ the stricter perfection criterion
offered by Farrell and Maskin-strong renegotiation-proofness. The idea is that
equilibrium should not be robust only to an offer that transfers the parties,
internally, from one path to another. It should be robust to an offer that
transfers the parties to any other weakly RPE. The intuition is simple: if both
parties are better off deviating concurrently to a different equilibrium, at any
point during the course of a given equilibrium, then that equilibrium is Pareto
inferior and thus implausible. Formally, an SPE is considered a strongly RPE if
it is weakly RPE and there exists no other weakly RPE that Pareto dominates it.
We submit that the lower bound of the weaky RPE set is the only strongly RPE.
73 Further, recall that Figure 2 displays only one SPE, but there are infinitely more of these. For
instance, the reward path can be higher than the one in Figure 2 (but still below the equilibrium
path) if the military inequality between the states is lower. That is, the results of a full-scale war
deter the weak state to a lesser degree, and therefore the post-war terror level is higher than the
one described in Figure 2. In such a case, the minimal punishment path must also be higher than
the one in Figure 2.
74 A similar pattern emerges from the Israeli-Hamas conflict. The involvement of the U.S. and
effective Egyptian mediation, as well as the heavy costs of war to both parties, enabled several
rounds of "renegotiation" following Hamas deviations from the fragile status quo. In the 7 days
of the conflict in 2012, which involved targeted Israeli air strikes and massive Hamas shelling of
more than half of Israel's population, effective mediation prevented it deteriorating into a full-
scale war and a massive Israeli incursion. Israel accepted the renegotiated terms, however, not
based on the assessment that Hamas wanted to keep its word but rather based on the assessment
that Hamas needed to comply based on its own interests. See Aaron David Miller's analysis of
expected Hamas compliance with the renegotiated terms, infra note 86.
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To see why, take the interval (T, t] in Figure 2. All the SPEs that
correspond to the terror levels within this interval are weakly RPE, as
established in the previous section. If the terror level in equilibrium is anywhere
above the lower bound, T, however, a Pareto superior deal can still be achieved
after provocation by W. In return for "looking the other way" when S is
provoked, W commits to a lower terror level in a different weakly RPE than the
original one. Both states are better off this way, implying that the original weakly
RPE is not strongly RPE.
The reason is simple. W is always better off avoiding a full-scale war. For
marginal provocations, S is only slightly better off following its equilibrium
strategy and waging a full-scale war. If offered a new arrangement whereby
avoiding war strictly decreases the terror level, it becomes better off not waging
war. Therefore, both states will agree. Clearly, however, such renegotiation is not
possible if the original equilibrium path is t. S cannot be persuaded to forego the
war for the promise to switch to a lower level terror, because the latter does not
underlie a weakly RPE. Therefore, only T is a strongly RPE, which reflects the
best prediction for the ad bellum threshold requirement."5
The example of the recent U.S.-Syria conflict is striking in this regard.
President Obama had set a clear red line for the Syrian regime-that is, the use
of chemical weapons. Syrian president Assad violently breached that line. The
U.S.'s threat to go to war was credible, and the strike was imminent. Last minute
discussions brokered by Russia yielded a deal which involved disarming Syria of
its chemical capabilities in exchange for not suffering war against a militarily
superior state. In other words, the U.S. agreed not to attack and Syria has agreed
to switch to a different equilibrium, whereby its mass destruction capabilities are
neutralized.76
We have shown that the strongly RPE addresses the first two downsides of
the weak renegotiation-proofness refinement criterion. That is, the prediction as
to the actual threshold rule became clearer, indicating a specific critical mass of
terror, t, which justifies resort to a full-scale war by the victim state. Further, the
nature of the negotiation is no longer restricted to returning to the status quo.
The third critique is different, however. It does not question the equilibria that
75 Interestingly, F is the lower bound for all possible strongly RPEs, because it is based on the
globally minimal punishment path (the lower envelope for all punishment paths). Therefore, even
if the parties are extremely differentiated by their military capabilities, terror cannot be totally
eradicated (or contained to its minimum level, p). The terror level is bounded by the indifference
threshold, t. Therefore, it reflects the most plausible threshold rule.
76 See, for example, Syria Hails U.S.-Russia Deal on Chemical Weapons, BBC NiEws (Sept. 15, 2013),
available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24100296; U.S. Dept. of State,
Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons (Sept. 14, 2013), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247.htm.
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survive weak renegotiation refinement. On the contrary, it questions the weak
renegotiation refinement criterion itself. Specifically, it does not consider the
status quo ante as a viable alternative to war because the weak state might simply
repeat the same pattern in the future. Therefore, it could be that waging war is
preferable for S after all.
Using the example in Figure 2 again, that critique relates to any equilibrium
path, t, within the set t, F).77 When a provocation occurs and renegotiation
begins, S knows that W shall not truly return to the status quo ante. It realizes
that W may repeat the pattern of provocation and renegotiation in the future.
This means, effectively, that what is really "on the table" from the strong state's
standpoint is either to adhere to the SPE strategy, go to war, and suffer the post-
war (lower) terror levels, or, alternately, to suffer from an effectively higher terror
level than before. In other words, S contemplates whether to stick to the current
SPE or move to a different one.
However, W has a primary incentive to avoid war. Thus, it is not expected
to effectively increase the future terror level to the corresponding punishment
path (or above it). This is because if it did so, war would become cost-effective
for S. In fact, W is expected to increase the terror level to be marginally below the
corresponding punishment path, keeping S marginally better off not waging a
full-scale war.78 In other words, the provocation-renegotiation pattern exhausts
the maximal tolerance level of S, but never goes further than that. Consequently,
even if the offer to return to the status quo is unrealistic, S is still unlikely to go
to war because W would most likely impose terror just lower than the level that
should trigger war in response. In these circumstances, even if S does not believe
that the return to the status quo is feasible, going to war is not cost-effective for
it. Thus, any terror level below t remains implausible, this critique
notwithstanding. This rationale, however, expires when terror level reaches F.
Because E underlies a strongly RPE, the weak state cannot repeat the strategy of
"provocation and renegotiation" as before. If it does provoke S by intending to
increase terror above T, it will suffer the consequences of a full-scale war; no
renegotiation can help to avoid it.
We conclude, accordingly, that in any unequal conflict, the most plausible
SPE is the strongly RPE. Therefore, the expected level of terror in equilibrium
77 In the range [i, fl, renegotiation is not relevant ab initio. This critique relates to weakly
renegotiation refinement, which as discussed, applies to cases where punishment of S by W is
foreseeable. Namely, only relevant to the range L, t).
78 The idea is simple. For any t E [t, t) the benefits of war are t + - (t2 (t) - t (t)) t where
t2 (t) and t, (t) are the punishment and reward level of terror that corresponds to t, respectively.
Hence keeping the punishment just below t2 (t) renders war cost-inefficient for S.
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would be the lowest among all possible levels that are immune to weak
renegotiation.
Still, one may argue that we have obtained a subjective ad bellum threshold
rule. After all, F depends on the discount factor of the strong state. Different
states may have different discount factors, implying different states may be
eligible to wage war under different levels of provocations. But why should such
a conclusion be surprising? For example, a victim state with a developed civil
defense infrastructure will suffer fewer casualties and less destruction compared
to a less protected state facing the very same attack. Theoretically, this may lead
to the conclusion that two states that are similarly attacked may experience
different levels of damage, and exercise different levels of retaliation.
Consequently, the ad bellum review of their response may be different. 9
In fact, this differential outcome aligns with basic intuitions about the right
of self-defense. Different levels of vulnerability or offensive capacity of the
victim lead to different conclusions in determining whether the victim's
response is indeed a legitimate instance of self-defense." The requirements of
imminence, last resort, and proportionality are all dependent upon the varying
victim's vulnerability or offensive capacity.
8 1
C. Violating the Threshold Requirement
The previous discussion yields two main conclusions. First, any SPE whose
equilibrium path reflects a rather low terror level is not weakly RPE. We
maintain that this is why the threshold rule in customary laws of armed conflicts
is not intolerant. Second, insofar as there are multiple weakly RPEs, we argue
that T, which constitutes the lower bounds of all strongly RPEs, is the most
plausible candidate to quantitatively describe the ad bellum threshold rule.
Still, an SPE based on an intolerant trigger strategy, which can decrease
terror below F, is better for the strong state. The only thing precluding that
better outcome in our model is the possibility to renegotiate (and, presumably,
not the threshold requirement doctrine). Nevertheless, successful consummation
of renegotiation also depends on the level of transaction (or negotiation) costs.
79 In the military clash between Israel and Hamas in Gaza during the summer of 2014, Hamas
launched more than 100 rockets and mortars a day for 50 days on Israeli civilians. Yet the anti-
rockets system Iron Dome exhibited Israel's technological superiority, leaving almost zero
casualties among Israeli civilians as a result of these rockets. Therefore, many classified Israel's
strikes on Gaza as excessive using that argument exactly.
80 See Sloane, supra note 21, at 53.
81 In domestic law, it may seem reasonable that a physically challenged victim facing a young
attacker may shoot him in self-defense, yet a highly capable athlete under the very same
circumstances responding in the same way may not be permitted to claim self-defense.
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Like any other negotiation, its efficient conclusion can be prevented if
transaction costs are sufficiently high. Surprisingly, for the strong state, this is in
fact good news. If transaction costs are indeed high enough such that successful
renegotiation is impossible, then the intolerant trigger strategy and its underlying
SPE is viable (that is, renegotiation-proo). In other words, if renegotiation is
expected to fail, the strong state in unequal conflicts is expected to violate the ad
bellum threshold rule by employing an intolerant trigger strategy (and carrying it
out when needed).
Transaction costs with respect to renegotiation between conflicting states
are not rare. Leaders may have a hidden agenda to go to war. They also may not
necessarily have their country's best interests in mind (agency costs). Despite the
fact that a full-scale war is best avoided when the status quo ante is Pareto
superior to it, leaders from both sides may nonetheless exploit the situation for
political benefit. In which case the original threat to carry out such wars is
renegotiation-proof, and thus its underlying SPE is viable.s2
This conclusion is far from trivial. It indicates, counterintuitively, that
"bad" strong-state leaders who are determined to go to war may be the best
candidates to decrease state-sponsored terror and potentially avoid this war. The
fact that they ignore the rational limitations on war signals to the leaders of the
weaker state that they might stand behind their threat to go to war even if this
threat reflects an intolerant strategy-that is, even if it marks a very low level of
terror as a red line. Effectively eliminating the option of renegotiation is actually
a good thing for the strong side.
There are many examples of world leaders making this sort of seemingly
biased decision. A clear one is the decision of the Argentinean Junta to invade
the Falkland Islands in 1981. It is widely argued that this act was primarily
motivated by the need to divert domestic unrest to an international crisis."
President Clinton was also accused of using the attack on Sudan and
Afghanistan in August 1998 as a tool for distracting public attention from the
effects of the Lewinski scandal. Similar accusations were made against President
Bush, charging that the campaign against Iraq was not meant to address fears of
weapons of mass destruction but rather predominantly to gain control of oil
reserves or impose a new regional order.84 Their truth or falsity notwithstanding,
82 On the interaction between domestic and international considerations of leaders, see Robert D.
Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988).
83 See, for example, Amy Oakes, Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland
Islands, 15 SIHc. STUD. 431 (2006).
84 See David Hastings Dunn, Myths, Motivations and 'Misunderestimations': The Bush
Administration and Iraq, 79 INT'L AFF. 279 (2003); James P. Pfiffner, Did President Bush Mislead
the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq, 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 25 (2004).
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such accusations depict a situation in which renegotiation is expected to be
fruitless and war illegitimate.
Indeed, the international community can sometimes force the leaders of
the conflicting states to halt military actions and talk their way back to the status
quo ante. This assumes, of course, that it has the power to influence reluctant
leaders and is motivated to do so. The former relates, to some extent, to the
coercive power of international law and international institutions in general. (The
latter relates to the self-interests of these other states within the international
community, which we do not address in this work.)
The India-Pakistan standoff in 2001 demonstrates the impact of an
effective international community. Following an attack on the Indian parliament
in December 2001, India deployed a large military force on its border with
Pakistan accusing the latter of hosting and supporting the perpetrators' terror
organization. The military tension-on the edge of a full-scale war-was eased
within weeks of effective U.S. and E.U. diplomatic efforts. Clearly, the
international community was motivated to take action and avoid a potentially
catastrophic war between two nuclear superpowers."
In November 2012, an active international community helped to
successfully finalize negotiations between Hamas in Gaza and Israel, preventing
hostilities from developing into a full-scale war and a massive Israeli incursion
into Gaza.86 During the 1990s, a similarly active international community
prevented escalation into full-scale wars of the outbreaks of violence between
Israel and Hezbollah, resulting in a repeated pattern of understandings.87
85 See Pakistan to Withdraw Front-line Troops, BBC NEWs (Oct. 17, 2002), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/southasia/2335599.stm.
86 Reasons that the renewed cease-fire is expected to hold include "the fact that Netanyahu's
credibility is on the line, that Hillary Clinton is involved, that the U.S. is involved," according to
Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. Middle East negotiator and now vice president at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. Jonathan Ferziger, Mariam
Fain & Saud Abu Ramadan, Gaza Cease-fire Success Hinges on lsrael-Hamas Efforts, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 22, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-21/israel-hamas-agree-
to-truce-starting-today-after-egypt-talks.html. "Hamas doesn't want a military incursion and
doesn't want to jeopardize prospects of opening the border." Id. Unfortunately, in the summer of
2014, another collision occurred in the endless circle of violence. Israel, however, did not wage a
full-scale war against Hamas and, after 50 days of violence, the parties returned exactly to the
status quo ante, with the help of Egypt as mediator. Jodi Rudoren, Cease-Fire Extended, but Not on
Hamas's Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014), available at http://wvw.nytimes.com/
2014/08/27/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-strip-conflict.html?_r=0.
87 See Reuven Erlich, Agreements, Arrangements and Understandings Concerning Lebanon to
which Israel was Involved During the Past 30 years- Background, Data, Lessons and Conclusions,
INTELI.IGENCE AND TERRORISM INFORMATION CENTER AT THE CENTER FOR SPECIAL STUDIES,
available at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/data/pdf/PDF-06 235-2.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2015). A very similar pattern of collision and negotiation back to the status quo ante between
Israel and the Hezbollah took place again in January 2015.
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But this is not always the case. Even if the benefits of de-escalation are
clear to third parties, each individual third-party state would rather not incur the
costs of mediating-and certainly not actively buffering-the conflicting states
(a classic collective action problem). These too are types of transaction costs,
which may ultimately frustrate the negotiation between the conflicting parties.
These are the circumstances in which the threshold rule is expected to be
violated."8 Once again, this conclusion is not trivial. It indicates that an
international community determined to avoid war might unintentionally increase
the level of terror. It creates an atmosphere that undermines the credibility of
intolerant threats. These threats are not credible because both parties know in
advance that they are not renegotiation-proof. Both parties know that the strong
state will not execute its threat due to an expected renegotiation. An indifferent
or an incapable international community undermines the chances of such
negotiation being successfully concluded and, as a result, increases the credibility
of the intolerant strategy of the stronger state.
The low incentive for the international community to interfere helped
make Turkey's threat against Syria negotiation-proof, thus lowering the (Syria
originated) terror level by the P1KK virtually to zero. The U.S., Israel, and the
Sunni Muslim neighbors of Syria would not have objected to Syria being taught
an expensive lesson.89 An anemic and unmotivated international community is
also visible in the U.S. threats and invasions of both Panama and Grenada.
These two cases demonstrate a combination of agency costs (it was argued that
U.S. presidents had a hidden agenda for the invasions) and an international
community that had neither the power nor the incentive to stop the world's
strongest superpower. 90
Diplomacy regarding North Korea similarly demonstrates the combination
of an extreme agency problem alongside an ineffective international community.
As expected, the provocations seem to work well for the highly manipulative
regime that repeatedly violates international laws by threatening to attack its
southern neighbor, among others.91
88 A collective action problem is not the only obstacle in this respect. For instance, if a strong third
party is similarly situated in an unequal conflict of its own, it might be reluctant to force the
parties back to the status quo. Because successful renegotiation prevents the strong party from
sustaining low levels of terror, the third party, acknowledging that, might act strategically to set a
precedent for its own benefit,
89 See generally Zisser, supra note 16 (providing a general analysis of the Syrian position against U.S.-
Turkey-Israel).
90 See generally Ved P. Nanda, The Validi y of United States Intervention in Panama Under International Law,
84 AM.J. INT'L L. 494 (1990); Schachter, supra note 51.
91 See Max Fisher, Whby North Korea loves to threaten World War III (but probably won't follow through),
WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/
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Finally, a strong state should probably try to actively increase its transaction
costs and even frustrate any possible international mediation in regard to a
terror-sponsoring state. Clearly, it may succeed. Transaction costs are neither
fixed nor exogenous. Endogenizing transaction costs and the decision-making of
third parties, however, extends beyond the scope of our work. We have
confined ourselves to discussing the consequences of exogenously given
transaction costs, because our research interest is mainly to explain the tolerance
of the threshold requirement as well as the conditions of its possible violation.
While both turn on the level of transaction costs that renegotiation entails, they
do not depend upon how their magnitude is determined.
VI. CONCLUSION
The contribution of this work is threefold. First, it shows that an intolerant
trigger strategy can be credible and that credibility is thus not the reason for the
relative tolerance of the existing ad bellum threshold rule. Second, it posits that a
plausible reason for such rule is renegotiation perfection. Strong states normally
refrain from adopting intolerant trigger strategies because such strategies are not
renegotiation-proof, and thus have not evolved into a customary rule. Third, it
describes the circumstances under which strong states shall deviate from the
tolerant approach and violate the threshold rule. Specifically, if the transaction
costs are sufficiently high, renegotiation is expected to fail, and the strong state is
better off breaching the threshold rule.
These predictions can be tested empirically in future works. Clearly, the
heart of our model is the ability to communicate and successfully negotiate,
directly or indirectly, especially when the confrontation is on the verge of
escalation. If renegotiation is expected to succeed, then strong states are
expected to comply with the threshold rule. Subsequently, however, they must
be more tolerant and thus suffer more terror. On the other hand, if
renegotiation is expected to fail, then strong states are expected to act less
tolerantly, in violation of the threshold rule, but to benefit from a lower level of
terror. This insight provides a testable implication: the effect of transaction costs
on the terror level suffered by strong states. Other things being equal, as
transaction costs increase, the terror level from which a given state suffers
should be lower.
Lastly, the theme of this work can also be extended to the law of treaties,
challenging the conventional wisdom of compliance in that regard.92 In any
wp/2013/03/12/why-north-korea-loves-to-threaten-world-war-iii-but-probably-wont- follow-
through.
92 For a theory of international agreements, see generally Goldsmith and Posner, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL. LAW, supra note 5.
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bilateral treaty, the weak party that can be effectively sanctioned by the stronger
one seemingly cannot violate the agreement at all. However, as this model
predicts, costly sanctioning the weak side in response to mild violations is not
renegotiation-proof. Arguably, therefore, the strong state's power becomes idle
in such occasions. Stated differently, minor violations of the status quo are
expected to occur insofar as the transaction costs of renegotiation are relatively
low.
This work shakes some seemingly safe presumptions. Transaction costs
reveal a positive effect. Obeying international law seems credible in the eyes of
those terror-sponsoring states who, by definition, violate it. An effective
international community that takes action to prevent escalation of conflicts
actually increases the level of terror. A hidden agenda of leaders to resort to war
at any cost may actually lead to a lower level of terror and even to avoidance of
war. And maybe, this is only an expression of what a deeper intuition tells us:
that being strong may be a source of weakness, and weakness may sometimes be
a source of strength.
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VII. APPENDIX
Assume a sequential confrontation game in which state W chooses the
level of terror damage to be suffered by state S, t > t, and S, observing W's
actions, chooses whether to contain the imminent terror damage or to wage full-
scale war, w = {0,1}, respectively. State W always seeks to avoid a full-scale
war, but at the same time, to keep t as high as possible. State S, on the other
hand, p efers t to be as low as possible. The cost of war for S is denoted by t,
where t > t.
The only SPE is: {t; w = 0 if t 5 t and w = 1 otherwise}. Infinitely
repeating the single-shot game, however, suggests that any to E [t, t] can be
supported in SPE:
1. W plays t o ; S plays w = 0 if t ! t o and w = 1 otherwise,
2. If w = 1 replace to with t 1 (to) _ to and repeat stage 1
("punishing W"),
3. If t > to and w = 0 replace to with t 2 (t0 ) and repeat stage 1
("punishing "),
The conditions for these strategies to form an SPE are:
to + -8 (t 2 - t1 ) >- t >- t o + 8 (t o - t1 ) s. t t > t, where S is S's discount
factor.
The middle term is the costs of war, which must be sufficiently high to
prevent unprovoked war, namely, when t < to, but sufficiently high to
encourage war upon provocation, namely, when t > to. The terms on the right
and on the left denote the present value of the benefits of unprovoked and
provoked war, respectively. For simplicity, assume that both terms hold in
equality, subject to min t, = t (thereby we focus on the SPE presented in Figure
2).
Note that by comparing the left side to the right side, t 2 -> to. Further, the
left side implies that t 2 = t o  < to t = (1-S)t+ St (since mi t1 =
Therefore, any SPE in which t o < F entails that t 2 > to.
Any SPE wherein t 2 > t o is not weakly RPE: S will not punish W for
deviating and W will not punish S for not punishing it. Both parties prefer the
equilibrium path over the continuation equilibrium that requires them to engage
in a full-scale war. Hence, in any weakly RPE, it must be that t 2 = to, which
implies that the set [f, t] support the weakly RPE. In which case, only F is a
strongly RPE; for any other weakly RPE, S would be better off not punishing W
for deviating, and, in exchange, W will decrease t to some lower weakly RPE.
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